interpreted to mean that as long as a sworn witness is placed on the stand and voluntarily answers questions, cross-examination is satisfied. 8 This Note examines the Owens opinion and concludes that, although the Court achieved the correct result that the confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 802 were not violated, the Court's reasoning is erroneous, extreme, and not indicative of legislative history or precedent. This Note argues that the Owens Court misinterpreted both the case law relating to the history and purposes of the confrontation clause and the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), and thus unjustifiably limited a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and evidentiary right to exclude hearsay. This Note proposes a test for inquiry into the effectiveness of cross-examination which requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Ultimately, this Note concludes that, in the future, the Court's reasoning could lead to an erroneous and extreme result. A prior, out-of-court identification made by a cooperative witness, who has been sworn in and testifies at trial, but who claims absolutely no recollection of any circumstances surrounding the identification or the basis for the identification, will be admissible although obviously violative of the meaning of cross-examination under both the sixth amendment confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C).
II. FACTUAL' BACKGROUND
The respondent, James Joseph Owens, was tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California of assault with intent to commit murder of Correctional Officer John Foster. 9 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed and remanded. °T he events leading up to the trial were not in dispute. On April 12, 1982, Correctional OfficerJohn Foster was hit over the head and severely beaten with a metal pipe while he was on duty in the federal prison in Lompoc, California." Foster, suffering from a fractured skull and other bodily injuries, was subsequently hospitalized for nearly one month. ' 2 His beating resulted in severe memory impairment 13 and memory loss concerning the attack and regarding his visitors during his hospital stay. 14 On April 19, 1982, seven days after the attack, FBI Agent Thomas G. Mansfield unsuccessfully attempted to question Foster about the attack. 15 Mansfield found him groggy and lethargic; Foster had no memory of the name of his assailant. 1 6 On May 5, 1982, before Foster was discharged from the hospital,' 7 Mansfield interviewed him again. 18 Mansfield found Foster much improved and able to describe and answer questions about the assault. 19 In this interview, Mansfield asked Foster who had attacked him. 20 Foster responded that his attacker was Owens, an inmate in the Lompoc prison. At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Foster testified that, while he could remember events before the attack, the blows to his head, and the blood on the floor, he could not remember seeing his assailant. However, Foster could remember identifying Owens as his attacker during the interview he had had with Mansfield in the hospital in May. 22 Although Foster had had many other visitors during his hospital stay, 2 3 Foster could only recall seeing Mansfield. 24 Foster could not remember if any visitor implied or made suggestions that Owens had been Foster's assailant. Counsel for the defense unsuccessfully attempted to refresh Foster's memory by presenting Foster with hospital records. Although some of these records indicated that, at one time, Foster had named a person other than Owens as his assailant, Foster could remember only the statements he had made to Mansfield. 2 6 In fact, Foster testified at trial that his statement to Mansfield was "vivid" in his current memory and that he was also able to remember that when he made the identification he knew the basis for his identification. 27 However, Foster testified that he could not remember what had led him to conclude that Owens was his assailant. 2 8 Based on the evidence, Owens was convicted in the district court of assault with intent to commit murder and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. 2 9 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. 3 0 The court of appeals held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment l and Federal Rule of Evidence 80232 were violated 3 3 when Foster's out-of-court identification was admitted. 3 4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 5 to address the conflict between the decision of the Ninth Circuit and the decisions of other circuits concerning the issue of the meaning of cross-examination under the sixth amendment confrontation clause 3 6 and Federal Rule of Evidence 8023 7 when the declarant of a prior out-of-court statement of identification suffers memory loss concerning the basis for his or her previous identification at trial. 
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

A. JUSTICE SCALIA'S MAJORITY OPINION
In United States v. Owens, 9 the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the admission of a prior statement of identification made out of court by a witness who suffered memory loss regarding the foundation of the identification is not contrary to the sixth amendment confrontation clause. 40 Furthermore, according to the Court, admission of the prior, out-of-court identification does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 802. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 4 2 stated that, although the sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees the accused, in criminal proceedings, the right to " 'be confronted with the witnesses against him,' "43 this right guarantees only an opportunity to cross-examine a witness effectively, not effective cross-examination. 4 4 Justice Scalia subsequently interpreted the phrase "subject to cross-examination," found in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (C), 4 5 to mean that the sworn witness is placed on the stand and "responds willingly to questions," and no more. 46 The Court concluded that the admission of out-of-court testimony does not violate either the confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802 where there exists memory loss resulting in an inability to testify at trial as to pertinent facts and events or an inability to testify to and elaborate upon an out-of-court identification. 4 7 As long as the witness who made the prior statement of identification is still able to be placed on the stand and cross-examined, the Court concluded that neither the confrontation clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated. For, according to the Court, the defense has been afforded an opportunity for cross-examination which satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause, 48 and the exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) 49 applies, rendering such a statement not hearsay. 50 Justice Scalia began the majority opinion of the Court with a history and description of the sixth amendment confrontation clause and its development in case law. 5 
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been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as providing a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine "adverse'witnesses," 5 2 the Supreme Court has never held that the memory loss of a witness results in a violation of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 53 However, the Court added that it had twice left open the possibility that memory loss could lead to a confrontation clause violation.
54
For example, Justice Scalia noted that, while the Court in California v. Green 55 found testimony given at a preliminary hearing to be constitutionally admissible when the witness was cross-examined at the trial, 56 the Court did not rule on the question of whether or not the witness' out-of-court statements about certain events to a police officer were admissible when the witness could not remember the events during the trial. 5 242-43 (1985) (holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause affords the accused an opportunity to test witness memory and allows the jury the opportunity to evaluate the witness' demeanor); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)(holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees an "adequate opportunity for cross-examination," which is violated if cross-examination is denied).
53 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841. 54 Id. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1 9 7 0)(noting that the issue of whether the memory loss at trial of a witness with respect to his or her prior, out-ofcourt statement could result in a violation of the confrontation clause was not "ripe for decision"); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 17, 21 (1985)(per curiam)(because the case did not involve the admissibility of a prior, out-of-court statement, but instead involved the admission of expert testimony when the expert cannot remember the basis for his opinion, the Court did not address whether the declarant's memory loss resulted in a violation of the confrontation clause 58 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring)). Justice Harlan stated that even a witness with memory loss is available for cross-examination. However, "to the extent that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts," Justice Harlan would still find no violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Green, 399 U.S. at 188-89 (Harlan, J., con-As a further illustration of the possibility of witness memory loss leading to a violation of the confrontation clause, Justice Scalia cited Delaware v. Fensterer. 59 In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the expert witness could testify as to his opinion but could not recall the foundation for his opinion, the confrontation clause was not violated. 60 In justifying its holding, the Fensterer Court stated:
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. 6 '
Justice Scalia added in Owens that an expert witness who cannot remember the basis for his or her opinion can still be discredited, for the jury may find "'that his opinion is as unreliable as his
The majority next characterized the main issue in Owens to be the question left unresolved by the Court in Green. The Court stated that it must decide the issue of whether the memory loss of a witness significantly affects cross-examination so as to result in a violation of the confrontation clause. 63 The answer, according to the Court, is found in the suggestion made by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Green.' 4 Justice Scalia recapitulated that " '[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not curring). Justice Harlan did qualify his conclusion by adding that the prosecution must act reasonably and in good faith to produce a witness before attempting to admit out-ofcourt statements. Id. at 189 n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring 
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8 cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' .... 65 Justice Scalia continued by stating that Fensterer illustrates that the opportunity still exists when a witness testifies to his or her current belief, but cannot remember the basis for his or her belief 6 6 Consequently, Justice Scalia reasoned that, as long as the defendant "has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness's bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even.., the very fact that he has a bad memory," the opportunity for cross-examination is satisfied. Thus, according to the Court, it follows that because an inquiry into these matters satisfies the constitutional requirement of an opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his or her current belief, but cannot remember the basis for this belief, the same inquiry should be constitutionally sufficient when the witness testifies as to a past belief but cannot remember the basis for this belief. 68 The Court reasoned that, in cases such as these, cross-examination cannot elicit fror the witness the basis for the belief. However, there are various methods available to discredit the belief.
7 0
Justice Scalia gave two examples of testimony of current and past beliefs coupled with memory loss of the basis for the beliefs. The Court reasoned that testifying "I believe this to be the man who assaulted me, but can't remember why" would appear more injurious and thus require further "memory testing" 72 than the statement "I don't know whether this is the man who assaulted me, but I told the police I believed so earlier." 7 Justice Scalia concluded that such memory-testing is not necessary in order to achieve an opportunity for effective cross-examination. 74 
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the statement made by a witness with memory loss. Justice Scalia qualified this assertion by adding that, although the alternative methods may not always be successful in impugning the witness' testimony, success in cross-examination is not guaranteed by the Constitution. 75 In the second part of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia recognized that, traditionally, out-of-court identifications would be characterized as hearsay and that there is somewhat of an overlap between the requirements of the sixth amendment confrontation clause and the hearsay rule. 76 The majority then noted that the court of appeals was aware of, and influenced by, the dangers that accompany hearsay. Thus, the court of appeals had reasoned that the Constitution required statements to undergo testing for " 'indicia of reliability' ,77 or "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' " 78 Justice Scalia disagreed with the analysis of the court of appeals. According to the majority, inquiries into "indicia of reliability" or "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are not necessary "when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. ' 79 The Court agreed with Green and acknowledged that the constitutional requirements of the confrontation clause are satisfied by the oath the witness takes, the opportunity given the defense to cross-examine, and jury observation of the witness' demeanor. 8 0 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that testimony by a forgetful witness that he or she had previously believed the defendant was his or her assailant is not constitutionally different, 74, 89 (1970) ). According to the Court in Dutton, "indicia of reliability" determine whether ajury can hear certain testimony so as not to violate the confrontation clause. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. 78 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The Court in Roberts held that "indicia of reliability" determine whether or not a statement is admissible. If the statement falls within a hearsay exception, then reliability can be inferred. Otherwise, when reliability is not shown, the statement is inadmissible unless "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" exist. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 79 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843. 80 Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 158-61).
under the confrontation clause, from admission of the witness' prior statement of identification. 8 '
The Court next answered the respondent's argument that statements concerning identification are subject to certain dangers and that cross-examination is very important where hearsay testimony is concerned. 8 2 Justice Scalia stated that the respondent did not argue that Foster's identification was subject to suggestive procedures. Thus, the Court was unwilling to hold that a "mere possibility of suggestive procedures" renders out-of-court statements of identification "inherently less reliable than other out-of-court statements." Foster's memory loss precluded him from being "subject to crossexamination concerning the statement." ' 8 The Court disagreed with this construction of "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." According to Justice Scalia, a better interpretation would be that a sworn witness is placed on the stand and willingly answers questions. 8 9 The Court justified its interpretation by comparing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). 90 The Court noted that Congress was aware that witness forgetfulness is a "recurrent evidentiary problem," for 81 Id. 82 Id. (citations omitted). 83 Id. 84 
Id.
85 See supra note 5. 86 See supra note 7. 87 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843. 88 Id. However, the Court mentioned that the court of appeals held that the violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence was harmless (a "more-probable-than-not" standard was applied instead of the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard which applies to confrontation clause violations). Id. at 843-44. 89 Id. at 844. The majority noted that the cross-examination that had occurred in Owens comports with this interpretation. Furthermore, the Court recognized that the trial court can place limits on the scope of cross-examination or the witness can assert the defense of privilege, both of which would diminish the significance of cross-examination. However, the Court qualified these limits by asserting that the memory loss of a witness does not preclude effective cross-examination. Instead, cross-examination often results in a finding that the witness has lost his or her memory with respect to a statement which can be used to defeat any effect the previous statement had. This is all that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) requires with respect to the provision that the cross-examination must "concern the statement." Id.
90 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) states: "(a) . . . 'Unavailability as a witness'
875
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) provides for situations of witness memory loss. 9 ' Thus, Congress obviously chose not to include witness forgetfulness in the exceptions to Federal Rule of Evidence
The majority explained that, according to the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), Congress' basis for the Rule was that, in general, out-of-court identifications are preferable to in-court identifications, provided that there are protections against suggestiveness. 9 3 Thus, the Court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C) applies to problems such as the one in Owens in which a witness' memory loss precludes him or her from making an in-court identification or from elaborating upon the details or the foundation for the previous, out-of-court identification.
94
In answer to the respondent's contention that the Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) creates an inconsistency within the Federal Rules of Evidence, 95 Justice Scalia stated that this is not a substantive inconsistency but a "semantic oddity," which is caused by the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) describes hearsay exceptions in situations in which the witness will be deemed "unavailable" to provide for convenient referencing to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b). 96 
R. EVID. 804(b)
. The situations include privilege, refusing to testify following a court order to do so, inability to testify because of memory loss, death, physical or mental SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 79
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dence 804(a) had been "Unavailability as a witness, memory loss, and other special circumstances," 97 there would be no visible inconsistency with Federal Rule of Evidence 801 which defines exceptions to hearsay.
98
Justice Scalia concluded the opinion of the Court by recognizing that the situation in Owens illustrates the "verbal curiosity" that a witness can be "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) and simultaneously "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). 9 9 However, Justice Scalia concluded that it is obvious that the two phrases pertain to separate circumstances and are not required or expected to coincide.' 0 0
The Court held that there was no violation of either the sixth amendment confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802 when the trial court admitted an out-of-court statement of identification made by a witness with memory loss who was unable to recall the basis for his identification. 1 0 Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the court of appeals.' 0 2
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's opinion. 10 3 Justice Brennan concluded that the constitutional right of confrontation is more than the mere procedural protection afforded by the majority.' 0 4 According to the dissent, the sixth amendment guarantees the defendant in a criminal proceeding the right of cross-examination in order " 'to affor [ 1)(A),(B) and (C). The majority asserted, for example, that it would be odd for a witness who claims a memory loss of the underlying facts of his or her testimony from a previous proceeding to be able to avoid introducing statements from that previous proceeding which are inconsistent with his or her testimony at trial. stated that Owens was denied this guarantee, 10 6 arguing that Foster's severe loss of memory precluded any attempts at cross-examination to determine the "trustworthiness or reliability of the identification." 1 0 7 Thus, according to the dissent, cross-examination of Foster would not have mitigated some of the dangers associated with out-of-court testimony.' 0 8
Justice Brennan also criticized the Court's narrow holding that the confrontation clause merely protects the defendant's right to cross-examine "live witnesses," notwithstanding the witnesses' answers.' 0 9 The dissent argued that, in deciding whether or not to admit out-of-court testimony, the Court should determine whether the loss of memory so severely hinders cross-examination that the jury would not be able to determine the truth of the evidence. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that, because of Foster's memory loss, he could not give anything more than "stale and inscrutable evidence." This situation, according to the dissent, is analogous to the hypothetical in which Foster died because of his beating. For, if the court had allowed Mansfield to testify in that situation, he would have been able to give nothing more than "stale and inscrutable evidence." Thus, the dissent reasoned that, just as in the latter case, in which Mansfield would not be allowed to testify as to Foster's out-of-court identification, in the former case, Foster should also not be allowed to testify. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent John Foster's memory was dead, and thus, Foster was incapable of expounding on his story. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
878
[Vol. 79 Based on its analysis, the dissent directly confronted the Court's conclusion that there was no violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Instead of asserting that the right to confront one's witnesses is a "procedural trial right" guaranteeing the " 'opportunity for effective cross-examination,?",1 117 the dissent argued that the Court has never held that the confrontation clause only guarantees the "right,to question live witnesses, no matter how futile that questioning might be."'I" The dissent continued by noting that prior case law has upheld the notion that the confrontation clause guarantees " 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination.' "119 Justice Brennan added that, while the Court has never determined "effectiveness" by success, the Court has also never "equated effectiveness with the mere opportunity to pose questions."' 20 Instead, the dissent argued, the Court has implied in the past that effectiveness involves determining whether cross-examination has presented the jury with '" a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 
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prior statements. 124 Justice Brennan stated that the constitutional guarantee of the confrontation clause is that the defendant will be able to present the jury with enough information with which it can "assess[] the validity of the evidence offered."' 25 Consequently, because the expert's memory loss in Fensterer was "self-impeaching," the confrontation clause was satisfied.1 26 Thus, Justice Brennan did not believe that Fensterer departed from traditional confrontation clause philosophy.
The dissent further disagreed with the Court's adoption of Fensterer for the principle that "all live testimony as to a witness's past belief is constitutionally admissible, provided the defendant is afforded an opportunity to question the witnesses."' 2 7 The dissent criticized this reasoning for erroneously broadening Fensterer's rule. The dissent argued that, while the memory loss in Fensterer was "self-impeaching," such a characterization does not extend to all instances of forgetting. 28 According to the dissent's standard for admitting out-of-court statements, 29 Foster's severe memory loss prevented "meaningful examination or assessment of his out-ofcourt statement," and should not have been admitted. 130 Justice Brennan recognized that the majority might fear that such an argument could result in a plethora of constitutional challenges to the admissibility of out-of-court statements. However, he responded that there is no reason for such fear.' 3 1 First, Justice Brennan stated that cases of complete memory loss, such as Owens, are rare. Usually, the cases will involve partial memory loss or complete memory loss coupled with deception, in which the jury can determine the "reliability and trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement."' 3 2 Second, if the jury cannot determine the "reliability and trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement," the statement is ad-124 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Fensterer, the dissent noted, an expert witness could not remember which scientific theory he had used to formulate his opinion. Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 126 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that, although the witness' memory of which scientific theory he had used would have resulted in very effective crossexamination, such cross-examination is not the constitutional minimum. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 128 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 129 The dissent argued that determining whether or not to admit out-of-court statements when a memory loss is involved "depend[s] on whether the memory loss so seriously impedes cross-examination that the factfinder lacks an adequate basis upon which to assess the truth of the proffered evidence." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 130 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). missible if it contains "indicia of reliability."' 33 Third, "effectiveness" can be determined for confrontation clause issues in the same way it is determined with evidentiary issues in order to protect "individual liberty," even at the possible expense of "efficient judicial administration."1 3 4
The dissent concluded that, while it agreed with the Court that the confrontation clause does not ensure that every witness will not give testimony "mhrred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion" and that giving the defendant "'"a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination I... satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause, 13 5 the right of cross-examination primarily functions to " 'promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.' "136 Justice Brennan found cross-examination of Foster to be futile. Thus, according to the dissent, the majority's holding that Foster's cross-examination satisfied the requirements of the confrontation clause is a reduction of "the right of confrontation to a hollow formalism."' 3 7 Consequently, Justice Brennan completed his argument by stating that no matter how severe a witness' loss of memory is, the confrontation clause ensures more than the defendant's right to question a "live witness." 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW stitutional right to confront one's witnesses in any criminal trial. The scope and purpose of the confrontation clause were explained by the Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States. 14 2 According to the Mattox Court, the essential purpose of the confrontation clause is:
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . .
[from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. 1 4 3 Thus, through cross-examination, the accused is afforded the right to test the witness' memory and to place the witness on the stand so that the jury can observe the witness' demeanor and evaluate the credibility of the witness' testimony. 144 Consequently, the sixth amendment confrontation clause "guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."' 155 B.
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(C)
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C) provides that, if the declarant of an out-of-court statement of identification testifies at trial and is cross-examined with respect to this statement, the statement is not hearsay. 15 ) . The Court in Stincer noted that this "limitation is consistent with the concept that the right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal trial." Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. Thus, while effectiveness is not the standard for cross-examination, at a minimum, reliability is the standard. Consequently, cross-examination must involve something more than mere procedure.
156 See supra note 7. 157 For example, the Senate and House Reports both state that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) was desirable because of the suggestiveness of the courtroom, because there is a limitation on the admission of the testimony that the declarant be present at trial and be cross-examined, and because memory fades with time and cases are not tried immediately due to crowded dockets. According to the Report of the House of Representatives, use of the exception to hearsay must meet two requisites.' 58 First, the declarant must testify at trial and must be cross-examined concerning the statement. Second, once this requirement is fulfilled, constitutional standards must be met before the prior, out-of-court identification will be admitted.' 5 9 These constitutional standards are the due process standards of the fifth' 60 and fourteenth' 6 ' amendments to the United States Constitution. Thus, all surrounding circumstances must be considered to ascertain "whether the identification procedure was 'unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification.' "162
The rationale behind Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), according to the House Report, lies in the fact that in-court identifications can be quite suggestive.' 63 On the other hand, out-of-court identifications are usually more reliable, for these statements are often made very soon after the perception, when the declarant's memory is fresh. With time the memory fades, and because there is often a great lapse of time between arrest and trial, out-of-court identifications can lead to increased fairness to defendants because the accuracy of the statements is ensured.1 64 Furthermore, memory loss of a witness would no longer automatically result in dismissal of a case. 16 
5
The Senate discussed the same issue and came to the same conclusions as the House of Representatives.' 66 The Senate Report noted that studies have shown that identifications made soon after perception are more reliable than those made in court. Reliability, in turn, increases fairness.' 6 7 In connection with reliability, the Senate noted that the out-of-court identification usually takes place before the declarant has been bribed or forced to change his or her 158 H.R. Rep In United States v. Owens, Justice Scalia concluded that the Constitution does not guarantee successful cross-examination. 172 Instead, according to the majority, as long as the defendant is permitted to expose a variety of factors which a witness may carry with him or her, such as the witness' prejudices, bad eyesight, inattentiveness, and bad memory, the defendant's opportunity to crossexamine has been satisfied. 173 This interpretation of opportunity, according to the Court, is the constitutional guarantee. 174 For Justice Scalia, then, the processes of swearing in the witness, cross-examination of the witness, and jury observation of the witness' demeanor fulfill the requirements of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. 17 5 In formulating his conclusions about the requirements of the confrontation clause, Justice Scalia relied on California v. Green and Delaware v. Fensterer, which the Court recognized as not answering the question of whether an out-of-court statement is admissible when the declarant suffers memory loss with respect to the basis for the statement. 176 However, by analogizing the facts of Fensterer to the facts of the case before the Court, Justice Scalia interpreted Fensterer too broadly, as Fensterer did not involve out-of-court statements, but rather involved the admission of an expert's opinion when the expert could not recall the basis for his opinion. 177 179 Thus, by analogizing Fensterer to Owens, the majority read Fensterer erroneously as deeming all out-of-court statements relating to a witness' past beliefs to be admissible, provided that the opposing side has the opportunity to question the witness and elicit any qualities of confusion, evasion, memory loss, or other discrediting qualities. 180 The Fensterer Court could not have meant such a broad standard of admissibility, for the Court limited its interpretation of the right of cross-examination to expert witnesses. The Court stated that "[q]uite obviously, an expert witness who cannot recall the basis for his opinion invites the jury to find that his opinion is as unreliable as his memory."' 18 1
However, expert witnesses offer a special circumstance. Because expert testimony consists of the expert's opinion, if the expert cannot remember the basis for his or her opinion,. the memory loss serves to be "self-impeaching."' 182 But, not all memory loss or forgetfulness can be described in this way. 183 For instance, Foster's statement was not one of opinion, but one of identification. Although Foster could not recall the basis for his previous identification, statements of identification are not in the same category as expert opinions. An expert who cannot recall the basis for his or her opinion may appear to a jury to be less of an expert in the field than he or she is purporting to be. An ordinary person who cannot recall the basis for his or her identification, on the other hand, is merely forgetful. And, in Foster's case, the beating he sustained is the only reason his memory was severely impaired. 184 When coupled with Foster's ability to recall many of the events surrounding the attack, such as his injuries, how he was struck on the head, seeing blood on the floor, and jamming his finger into his assailant's chest,18 5 Foster's memory loss does not appear to be "self-impeaching," as was the expert's memory loss in Fensterer. Consequently, Justice Scalia's analogy to Fensterer is not justifiable, and thus Justice Scalia merely begged the question by stating:
If the ability to inquire into these matters [i.e., witness' prejudices, bad memory, etc.] suffices to establish the constitutionally requisite opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his current belief, the basis for which he cannot recall [as in Fensterer], we see no reason why it should not suffice when the witness's past belief is introduced and he is unable to recollect the reason for that past belief.' 8 7
As previously argued however, such an analogy cannot work, for Fensterer involved an expert's opinion, while Owens did not. 18 8 By merely stating that if cross-examination is satisfied in Fensterer, then it is satisfied in Owens, a similar instance, Justice Scalia neglected to discuss fully the reasons why Foster's memory loss should be treated similarly in light of legislative history and precedent. Thus, the Court left a gap that it never filled, even through its further analysis. It would have been more logical and instructive for the Court to have relied upon the history of the confrontation clause and general trends in the case law, instead of analogizing where no reasonable analogy exists, to determine the guarantees of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Mattox established that the right of confrontation involves cross-examination which affords the accused both an opportunity for memory-testing and the benefit of scrutiny by the jury of the witness' demeanor. 89 However, successive case law has expanded upon this definition of confrontation.
For example, the Pointer Court stated that cross-examination is valuable "in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case."19 0 Furthermore, the Court in Stincer stated that the right of cross-examination functions to "promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial."' 19 1 The Roberts Court added that "extraordinary cases" require an "inquiry into the 'effectiveness' " of cross-examination. 9 2 But, the Court further In Mancusi, the Court found it necessary to evaluate "the character of the actual crossexamination" because the defendant's representation was previously found to be inadequate, for counsel was appointed only four days before trial. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 n.12 (citing Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 209). Similarly, the situation in Owens seems to be extraordinary. The facts and Foster's memory of nearly everything except the basis for his previous statement of identification are not commonplace.
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noted that inquiring into every case regarding out-of-court testimony would be an exercise in futility and would undermine any "certainty and consistency in the application of the Confrontation Clause." 19 3 More recently, the Court in Fensterer noted that an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" is a constitutional guarantee.
1 94
Justice Scalia failed to recognize and consider these philosophies of cross-examination. Consequently, although the Court achieved the correct result that the confrontation clause was not violated, it did so in an illogical and presumptive way. The majority was overly concerned with the procedure of cross-examination and thus ignored the substance of cross-examination. The Court concluded that, as long as the sworn witness is placed on the stand for the jury to observe and is cross-examined without restriction, there is no reason to inquire into the reliability or trustworthiness of the testimony. 195 However, mere procedure is not constitutionally satisfactory. Even Fensterer stated that the opportunity for cross-examination involves searching for and exposing factors that can damage testimony, such as "forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion."' 9 6 But, Justice Scalia would admit out-of-court testimony as long as the declarant is placed on the stand, under oath, and cross-examined. 197 However, cases such as Owens are probably somewhat rare, 198 and thus, according to Roberts, an inquiry into the effectiveness of the crossexamination that the defense had the opportunity to engage in is in order. ' 99 At a minimum, such an inquiry requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, including all of the evidence, testimony, facts, and events. Upon an evaluation of Foster's cross-examination, using this totality of the circumstances approach, it appears that Foster was effectively cross-examined. For purposes of this analysis, it is important to note several factors surrounding Foster's cross-examination. First, both the petitioner and the respondent were in agreement with respect to the events and circumstances of the attack. 20 0 Second, even though Foster could not remember the basis for his identification and could not elaborate upon his prior identification of Owens as his assailant, Foster was able to recall several pertinent events surrounding the attack, "including the type of weapon that was used, the injuries he sustained, the location of the incident, and the fact that he jammed his finger into his assailant's chest." 20 1 Also, the jury could observe Foster's demeanor while he was on the stand. Third, counsel for respondent was able to show, through cross-examination, that Foster could not remember if he had seen his assailant during the attack. Respondent's counsel used this fact to discredit Foster's out-of-court identification. 2 02 These factors all lead to the conclusion that Foster was effectively crossexamined. 20 3 Thus, Owens' rights under the confrontation clause were not violated.
Indeed, even if the standards of "indicia of reliability" 20 4 and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" 20 5 are necessary for effective cross-examination, Owens passes both tests. 20 6 Each of these inquiries exists as a safeguard when the accused is not confronted by the hearsay declarant at trial because the hearsay declarant's absence from the trial renders him or her unable to be cross- 
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ing the attack, such as seeing blood on the floor, jamming his finger into his assailant's chest, the fact that a metal pipe was used, what injuries he sustained as a result of the beating, and where the attack occurred. 20 9 Taken as a whole and in light of all other corroborating testimony, 2 10 these facts are quite convincing that Foster's outof-court testimony was both reliable and trustworthy.
Constitutional standards demand confrontation, which guarantees "an [opportunity] .. . for effective cross-examination. ' 2 11 Fensterer, itself, which the Court relied upon heavily to justify its argument that the constitutional guarantee is the simple procedure of cross-examination, stated that "the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given afull and fair opportunity to probe and expose ... [certain] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony." 21 2 "[A] full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination" is exactly what the totality of the circumstances approach is designed to guarantee. It ensures that the jury has reason to impute great weight to the declarant's testimony or none at all. Even though effective cross-examination is not guaranteed, the opportunity to explore and reveal 2 13 factors which hinder the truth-finding and reliability functions 2 14 of confrontation and cross-examination must exist in all cases, rare or common. The totality of the circumstances approach provides a simple and direct method to evaluate the opportunity afforded the defense to expose factors which mar testimony and possibly render the testimony unreliable. By utilizing the totality of the circumstances approach and examining both out-of-court and in-court testimony, a court is better able tojustify the jury's reliance or lack of reliance on the out-ofcourt testimony in arriving at its verdict. Without the opportunity to expose witness deficiencies, the constitutional right of confrontation and accompanying cross-examination will be reduced "to a hollow formalism." cannot properly perform its function if highly probative and constitutional identification evidence is kept from it."222 If the out-of-court identification has been considered "highly probative," then the qualities which make the identification probative should be able to be explored. This interpretation comports not only with the Senate Report, but also with the House Report which mandated not only that cross-examination concerning the statement be satisfied, but also that constitutional due process requirements be satisfied.
3
According to the House Report, "[t]he due process standard requires looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the identification procedure was 'unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.' "224 If the constitutional standards are not met, then, according to the House Report, the out-of-court statement is not admissible.
25
In order to enhance the policies behind Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) and to examine the "totality of the circumstances," something more than the mere procedure of placing the sworn declarant on the stand and cross-examining him or her, without regard for the value of the responses obtained, is required. Indeed, the Senate Report confirms this interpretation. In justifying the desirability of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), the Senate Committee stated that cross-examination "assures that if any discrepancy occurs between the witness' in-court and out-of-court testimony, the opportunity is available to probe, with the witness under oath, the reasons for that discrepancy so that the trier of fact might determine which statement is to be believed.
26
Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C) does require more than the mere procedure of cross-examination. In fact, Weinstein noted that, "if the identifying witness claims no memory of the events defendant is charged with and cannot testify to the basis for the identification, his cross-examination is of no value since there will be no way of evaluating the probative force of the identification." 2 27 While this interpretation may seem to be a little extreme at first glance, Weinstein's interpretation exemplifies that the important aspect of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C) is the ability to "evaluat[e] the probative force of the identification. ' 2 28 As a result, the Court's comparison of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C) with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (3)229 approaches irrelevance. Although it is true that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (3) contains a provision concerning witness memory loss of a statement made, while Federal Rule of Evidence 80 1(d) (1) (C) does not, it does not follow that witness memory loss does not enter into the determination of whether the witness was "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. ' 23 0 As suggested by the House and Senate Committee Reports, the passage of time weakens one's memory and also opens up the opportunity for outside influences to cloud one's recollection. 23 1 While the very purpose, then, of allowing the admission of out-of-court statements of identification is to increase reliability and fairness during a criminal trial, 23 2 it does not follow that witness memory loss of the basis for the identification was a reason behind the desirability of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). Nowhere in the House and Senate Committee Reports does it discuss "witness forgetfulness of an underlying event." 23 3 Instead, the reports focus on the reliability and accuracy of out-of-court statements of identification. Any forgetfulness of the basis for the identification which may follow the out-of-court statement was not considered in the Committees' evaluations. 23 4 In any event, cross-examination of Foster meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which allows exceptions to hearsay. Cross-examination revealed that Foster could not remember seeing his assailant, but could recall that his assailant had used a metal pipe, what injuries were inflicted upon him by his assailant, the location of the beating, jamming his finger into his attacker's chest, and choosing Owens' picture from an array of photographs presented to Foster by Mansfield. 23 
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no longer remember why. 23 6 Consequently, Foster was subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, for the respondent was able to probe Foster's out-of-court statement of identification through cross-examination on account of Foster's detailed, but "selective," memory. Justice Scalia responded to this by stating that there is no "substantive inconsistency" but merely a "semantic oddity" between the two Rules. 239 Such an interpretation is an inadequate answer to a very real concern that it is impossible for a witness with memory loss to be "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), because a witness with memory loss is deemed "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3).240
The Court suggested that "Unavailability as a witness" is merely a "rubric" which could just as easily have been designated: "Unavailability as a witness, memory loss, and other special circumstances. ' "241 However, the Court did not give any support for this interpretation. In fact, Justice Scalia concluded the majority opinion with circular reasoning. The majority offered a hypothetical situation in which a witness claims memory loss of the facts of prior testimony which is inconsistent with the witness' present trial testimony. 24 2 Justice Scalia asserted that it would be odd to render the prior, inconsistent statement inadmissible because of the mem-
STANDARDS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
ory loss. 245 The Court continued by reaffirming the "verbal curiosity" that the witness is simultaneously "subject. to crossexamination" and "unavailable." 2 44 Justice Scalia completed his argument by stating what he termed the obvious: "[q]uite obviously, the two characterizations [i.e. "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) and "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (3)] are made for two entirely different purposes and there is no requirement. or expectation that they should coincide." 24 5 Justice Scalia did not restate his "semantic oddity" argument, but instead, finished by coming full circle, back to the inconsistency argument he dismissed earlier. The "semantic oddity" characterization thus appears to have been an unnecessary diversion, for it adds nothing more to Justice Scalia's conclusion that neither the confrontation clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 was violated by the admission of John Foster's out-of-court statement of identification. 
D. THE EFFECTS OF OWENS ON FUTURE INSTANCES OF WITNESS MEMORY LOSS
Finally, Justice Scalia failed to address the possible consequences of placing a sworn witness on the stand who "responds willingly to questions, ' 247 but is not able to testify as to any circumstances surrounding the incident, nor as to the basis for the prior, out-of-court identification. According to Justice Scalia's procedure-before-substance interpretation of both the confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), the accused has been given the "'."opportunity for effective cross-examination" '." guaranteed by the confrontation clause 248 and the hypothetical witness has been "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). 2 49 Such a result, however, seems quite aberrant in light of the very real possibility that the witness could have been mistaken in his or her identification. 
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In essence, the Court left no room for future courts ever to hold out-of-court testimony to be inadmissible. For, under the Court's analysis, "[t]he identification could be admitted even if: (1) The witness subsequently retracted it, and (2) the identification were made under highly suggestive circumstances." '2 5 ' The majority's broad interpretation of cross-examination "open[s] the doors wide to the admission of all kinds of out-of-court eyewitness identification." 25 2 Such a flood of admissions would undermine the essential reasons for allowing out-of-court statements to be admissible, i.e., increased reliability and increased fairness in criminal trials.
53
Indeed, if carried to the greatest extreme, Justice Scalia's reasoning would allow the admission of a prior, out-of-court identification of any willing witness on the stand who answers questions, even if all of the answers were "I forget" or "I do not know."
Answers such as these are constitutionally insufficient, especially when the witness, unlike Foster, further claims no memory of the surrounding circumstances. Justice Scalia, by not mentioning in his analysis Foster's memory of some of the circumstances surrounding the attack, left open the possibility that a witness who testifies that he or she cannot remember the basis for his or her out-ofcourt testimony, and who also has no memory of any circumstances surrounding the incident, can effect the conviction of the accused.
Such an interpretation of the majority's reasoning is even more compelling in light of Justice Scalia's failure to define or explain what "willingly responds to questions" means. In its broadest interpretation, this phrase could mean that a witness willingly responds "I do not know" or "I forget," while never giving substantive answers. In its narrowest interpretation, this phrase could mean that a witness willingly and affirmatively responds to questions with known answers, while only sometimes responding "I do not remember" or "I do not know." Under either interpretation, the Court forces the conclusion that, any answer, as long as the sworn witness willingly responds, would satisfy the requirements of cross-examination. Consequently, the phrase could be interpreted by courts in the future to mean that a willing witness who is unable to answer affirmatively any questions has been cross-examined under constitutional and evidentiary standards.
By abandoning substantive standards of cross-examination and by misinterpreting the import of the relevant legislative history, the Court left in question the impact in the future on cases with witnesses whose memories of surrounding circumstances are not as good as Foster's. As a result, the Court's reasoning could lead us down the path to absurdity in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Owens, the Supreme Court held that memory loss by a witness, resulting in no memory of the basis for a prior, out-of-court identification, does not violate either the sixth amendment confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802.254 By ignoring the limitations set forth in the relevant precedents and legislative history, the Court interpreted the scope of both the confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(C) in an overly broad and erroneous manner.
According to the Court, all that is constitutionally required by the confrontation clause is that the declarant be sworn in at trial and cross-examined without restriction. The Court rationalized this interpretation by asserting that an essential objective of cross-examination is to elicit the fact that the witness has a bad memory, accompanied by other discrediting factors, such as prejudices, carelessness, and the like.
2 55 The Court further argued that under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" is satisfied when a sworn witness is placed on the stand and willingly answers questions. The Court's reasoning is erroneous based upon the legislative history behind the Federal Rules of Evidence and a close reading of prior case law on the confrontation clause. The Owens Court failed to recognize substantive along with procedural aspects of cross-examination under the confrontation clause and "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C). Unfortunately, this defect in reasoning undermines both the purposes behind the confrontation clause to give a complete opportunity to examine and expose the common deficiencies found in many witnesses' testimony, such as "forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion," and to aid in the truth-finding and reliability functions of confrontation and the purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) to increase reliability and fairness by allowing prior, out-of-court identifications. By abandoning substance in favor of procedure, the Court created the illogical possibility that all 254 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 845. 255 Id. at 842-43. 256 Id. at 844.
